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Abstract 
Inflationary performance in sub-Saharan Africa since 1996 is examined.  Median inflation 
has tended to be higher than in other regions of the developing world, such as MENA and 
Latin America.  Inflation is highly persistent and is higher in countries that are less politically 
stable, in those without hard-peg exchange rate regimes, and in those with larger fiscal 
deficits.  Inflation has declined over time, at least at the upper end of the distribution.  There 
is no evidence that commitment devices such as inflation targeting have reduced inflation, but 
in SSA the sample is confined to two countries.  Inflation typically spikes after a devaluation, 
and is sensitive to supply-side shocks.  Movements in the real price of oil and rice (but not 
maize) have significantly affected the inflation rate.  In countries that are poor in oil and 
minerals and therefore more reliant on agriculture, output growth is negatively correlated 
with inflation, presumably because, when the harvest is good and agricultural output is high, 
the extra supply reduces food prices. Fiscal balances also display considerable persistence 
and are more favourable in resource-rich and politically stable countries and in those with 
hard-peg exchange rate regimes, and have improved over time.   
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Introduction 
The disinflation that was achieved in the advanced countries in the mid-1980s was slower to 
reach the developing world and emerging markets.  Median consumer price inflation amongst 
the advanced countries fell from 9.2% p.a. in 1975-84 to 3.6% in 1985-94, 2.0% in 1995-
2004 and 2.3% in 2004-13.  In middle-income and lower-income countries, the median 
inflation rate was 11.5% in 1975-84, 10.5% in 1985-94, 6.2% in 1995-2004 and 5.6% in 
2004-13.  Inflation was thus effectively dead in the advanced countries from the mid-1980s, 
aided by the collapse in oil prices in 1986.  In the developing world it was very much alive 
until at least the mid-1990s, since when there has been a gradual improvement. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to provide an overview of the interconnected issues of 
inflation, monetary growth and fiscal deficits in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the past two 
decades.  Empirical work such as that of Catão and Terrones (2005) and Lin and Chu (2013) 
shows that fiscal deficits are likely to be inflationary only in lower-income countries where 
the constraints on government borrowing are most acute.  At least until recent debt relief 
initiatives, most of sub-Saharan Africa has not been deemed sufficiently credit-worthy to 
borrow on international markets, whilst domestic debt markets also remain severely 
underdeveloped, which implies that the potential for fiscal deficits to be inflationary is 
particularly strong in SSA (Gueye and Sy, 2015). 
 
Although the theoretical relationship between these variables is well understood, we are not 
aware of any recent analysis of SSA experience of the type that we present here.  A particular 
issue is the role of supply-side shocks, which are likely to be important in SSA because of the 
large weight of agriculture in GDP and in the consumption basket.  Various studies have 
demonstrated the sensitivity of SSA agricultural output to climatic factors (Abidoye and 
Odusola, 2015; Barrios et al., 2010; Block, 2014). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. A broad picture of trends in inflation, monetary growth 
and fiscal balances is presented in Section One.  The results of some regression analysis using 
panel data are presented in Section Two.  Section Three considers the impact of shocks of 
various kinds: shocks to agricultural output, to oil prices and to the world price of staple 
foods that form a large part of the consumption basket in Africa.   Section Four contains a 
brief discussion of fiscal balances.  Conclusions are presented in Section Five.  The data 
source is World Bank World Development Indicators except where stated otherwise. 
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1. Overview of trends 
Any statistical analysis of inflation has to confront the fact that the distribution is typically 
heavily skewed to the right: inflation can reach astronomical positive values but not large 
negative ones.  In our regression analysis we deal with this in various ways that are discussed 
in the next section.  At a more elementary statistical level, this implies that the median is a 
more appropriate measure of central tendency than the mean, whilst measures of spread such 
as the standard deviation are highly sensitive to outliers.  Figure 1 shows the median inflation 
rate across SSA countries by year, and compares it with the same statistic for the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and Latin American regions.  In all regions there has been 
something of a downward trend, with median inflation rates after 1996 being somewhat lower 
than in the two decades up to that date; but in SSA inflation has tended to be a bit faster than 
in the other two regions in recent years, despite Latin America’s inflationary reputation 
(inflation rates were particularly high in 1994 and 1995 in SSA because of the number of 
countries affected by the large devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994). 
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Fig. 1: Median Consumer Price Inflation (% p.a.) in Different Regions 
 
 
 
It is also useful to consider the proportion of countries with inflation above some threshold 
level.  Exactly where the boundary lies between countries with major inflationary problems 
and those without is of course a matter of debate. Here we focus on two thresholds. The first 
is an inflation rate of 20%, above which countries would appear to have significant 
inflationary problems that threaten to get out of control; and the second is an inflation rate of 
10%, above which we regard countries as having moderate inflationary problems. Below a 
10% annual rate, it is not clear that inflation should be regarded as a major issue. 
 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of SSA countries with inflation above each of these thresholds 
in each year.  Particularly in the case of the higher threshold, the data suggest a distinct 
downward trend since the late 1990s, and in the case of both thresholds the picture today is 
much better than at any time in the period 1975-95. 
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Fig. 2: Proportion of Countries in sub-Saharan Africa with Inflation above a Threshold Level 
 
 
Fig 3: Median Fiscal Deficit (% GDP) and Inflation in SSA 1980-2013 
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Fig 4: Median Fiscal Balance (% GDP) in Different Regions  
 
 
Fig 5: Percentage of SSA Countries with Fiscal Deficits above a Threshold Level (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows the effect of fitting a regression line to the annual inflation data shown in Fig. 
1.  Transformed inflation has fallen on average by slightly less than a quarter of a percentage 
point per annum, and the trend is significant at 1%.   The probability of inflation exceeding 
20% has also fallen by an estimated 1.1% per annum. This negative trend at the higher end of 
the scale is not matched when we consider a lower threshold. The probability of inflation 
exceeding 10% has also been falling gently, but the trend is not statistically significant. 
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Table 1. Inflation in SSA 1996-2013 
 
 Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 9.41*** 
(13.7) 
  
Time -0.277*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.0112*** 
(-5.01) 
-0.0032 
(-0.96) 
n 691 691 691 
R-squared 0.018 0.056 0.001 
Standard error 10.49   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices.  The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. Time = year minus 2000. 
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2. Inflation, money growth and fiscal deficits 
 
The relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation is clear in theory: persistent deficits are 
financed either by seigniorage revenue or by a build-up of debt that must be eventually either 
monetized or reversed by a strong fiscal correction (or debt reduction through either 
repudiation or forgiveness).  The advanced countries have been helped in reducing their large 
post-World-War-Two debts by persistent, if mainly low, inflation, but the inflationary 
problems of the 1970s had no obvious fiscal cause.  Countries like Belgium and Ireland, 
which built up large debt-GDP ratios in the late twentieth century, have subsequently 
successfully reduced them through fiscal adjustment rather than seigniorage.  Nevertheless 
recent research by Catão and Terrones (2005) and Liu and Chu (2013) has demonstrated a 
significant long-run relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation, using annual data back 
to 1960 for a large sample of countries.1 
 
In order to address the issue over a shorter data period, we use a simpler approach than the 
autoregressive distributed lag method used by these authors.  We ignore the possibility of a 
correlation between current inflation and future fiscal deficits, and simply regress current 
inflation on current and past deficits.  Theoretically, it is perfectly possible for governments 
to collect seigniorage revenue today and use it to build up fiscal surpluses that can be used to 
fund deficits tomorrow.  As studies of hyperinflation show, however, in practice this never 
happens; inflation tends to undermine the real value of receipts from other taxes, because of 
the specification of tax liabilities in nominal terms combined with lags in collection.  By the 
time tax revenues are collected, their real value is lower, the faster the price rise since the 
liability was incurred.  We therefore assume as a first approximation that inflation can only 
cause current, but not future deficits, but that deficits can cause both current and future 
inflation, because the inflationary effects can be postponed through borrowing. 
 
Table 2 shows bivariate regressions of transformed inflation on (a) the current year’s ratio of 
the fiscal balance to GDP; and (b) the average of the same ratio over two, three and four 
years up to the current year. We use the ratio to GDP, even though Catão and Terrones (2005) 
show the ratio to narrow money (M1) to be theoretically preferable, because the M1 data are 
unreliable for some countries and Liu and Chu (2013) find the ratio to GDP to be a 
satisfactory alternative.  In each case the coefficient is significant and negative, as expected. 
                                                 
1 See Catão and Terrones (2005) for a theoretical model. 
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The fit of the regression tends to improve as the period over which the fiscal balance is 
averaged is lengthened, with the t-statistic increasing in absolute value from –2.16 for the 
current year to –3.62 for the four-year average. This is consistent with the idea that persistent 
deficits are more likely to be inflationary.   Nevertheless the proportion of the variation in 
inflation that is explained is very small, ranging from 0.4% for the current year to 1.5% for 
the four-year average.  The magnitude of the coefficients implies that an increase in the fiscal 
deficit by one per cent of GDP is associated with higher inflation of 0.1 to 0.2 percentage 
points. 
 
 
Table 2. Inflation and cumulated fiscal balances 
 Transformed 
inflation 
Transformed 
inflation 
Transformed 
inflation 
Transformed 
inflation 
Constant 7.22*** 
(20.0) 
6.84*** 
(20.9) 
6.58*** 
(22.6) 
6.32*** 
(23.6) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(current year) 
-10.59** 
(-2.16) 
   
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average current 
& previous year) 
 -17.63*** 
(-3.15) 
  
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
three years) 
  -18.58*** 
(-3.13) 
 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
four years) 
   -21.21*** 
(-3.62) 
n 617 599 580 560 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.015 
Standard error 9.33 8.58 7.88 7.09 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  SSA 
1996-2013 excluding small countries (population < 1.5 million). 
 
 
Table 3 shows similar regressions for the probability that inflation is greater than 20%.  This 
time the fiscal deficit for the current year is not quite significant at the 10% level, but the 
deficit averaged over two, three or four years is significant at 1%.  As in Table 2, the t-
statistic is highest for the four-year average, and the marginal effect implies that an increase 
in the deficit by 1% of GDP adds about 1% to the probability of inflation exceeding the 20% 
threshold.
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Table 3. The probability of inflation > 20% and cumulated fiscal balances 
Estimation 
method: probit 
Prob (inflation > 
20%) 
Prob (inflation > 
20%) 
Prob (inflation > 
20%) 
Prob (inflation > 
20%) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(current year) 
-0.364 
(-1.63) 
   
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average current 
& previous year) 
 -0.758*** 
(-3.01) 
  
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
three years) 
  -0.956*** 
(-3.94) 
 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
four years) 
   -0.996*** 
(-4.19) 
n 617 599 580 560 
pseudo-R-squared 0.008 0.028 0.043 0.051 
Notes.  The coefficients shown are marginal effects.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: 
significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  SSA 1996-2013 excluding small countries (population < 1.5 million). 
 
 
 
In Table 4 the same exercise is repeated for the probability that inflation exceeds 10%.  The t-
statistics show the same pattern of greater significance when the fiscal deficit is averaged 
over a longer period, but they are mostly lower than in Table 3.  Nevertheless the estimated 
marginal effect is slightly larger than for the higher threshold. 
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Table 4. The probability of inflation > 10% and cumulated fiscal balances 
Estimation 
method: probit 
Prob (inflation > 
10%) 
Prob (inflation > 
10%) 
Prob (inflation > 
10%) 
Prob (inflation > 
10%) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(current year) 
-0.646* 
(-1.82) 
   
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average current 
& previous year) 
 -0.945** 
(-2.27) 
  
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
three years) 
  -1.11** 
(-2.39) 
 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(average of last 
four years) 
   -1.38*** 
(-2.82) 
n 617 599 580 560 
pseudo-R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.013 
Notes.  The coefficients shown are marginal effects.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: 
significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  SSA 1996-2013 excluding small countries (population < 1.5 million). 
 
 
In the rest of this section, we explore the determinants of inflation in sub-Saharan Africa 
more deeply.  One of the purposes is to understand what underlies the improving trend.  Is it 
because of better fiscal positions, greater political stability, or more widespread use of 
commitment devices such as inflation targeting or hard-peg exchange rate regimes?  We shall 
find that, once inflation persistence is accounted for, the estimated time trend is no longer 
statistically significant and slightly positive, which suggests that the variables in our model 
help to explain the improvement in inflation performance since 1996. 
 
The variables in our model, apart from the ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP, are: a measure 
of the exchange rate regime that distinguishes hard pegs (essentially the CFA zone in this 
context), other pegs and floats; the change in the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate 
(plus its lag), to capture imported inflation; an oil producer dummy for countries whose oil 
rents exceed 10% of GDP; a mineral producer dummy for countries whose natural resource 
rents other than oil exceed 10% of GDP; a measure of political stability; and a dummy for an 
inflation targeting regime.  The source of the data is the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. 
 
The omitted category of regime is a soft peg.  With the exchange rate regime, as with a 
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number of other variables, there is always the question of endogeneity: the regime might be 
chosen because of the inflation rate, rather than vice versa.  In previous work we have argued 
that hard-peg regimes (currency unions or currency boards, each of which make unilateral 
decisions to devalue very difficult) can be regarded as exogenous (Bleaney and Francisco, 
2005).  This seems uncontroversial for sub-Saharan Africa, where hard pegs are primarily 
associated with being a former French colony.  On the other hand, the decision between a 
float and a conventional peg is more likely to be endogenous to inflation.  Floats are 
generally considered more volatile than pegs, but at higher inflation rates the real exchange 
rate becomes volatile also under pegs with periodic devaluations, which makes floating more 
tempting.  The inclusion of a float dummy in the regression is intended to capture correlation 
rather than causation; even were it to emerge with a significant positive coefficient, we would 
not want to push the argument that floats cause inflation. 
 
Similarly, we would not want to suggest that specialization in natural resources is 
theoretically associated with a higher (or a lower) inflation rate; but inclusion of dummy 
variables for these characteristics helps to test the robustness of the other coefficients. 
 
The measure of political stability is the political risk rating supplied by International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), which is measured on a scale of zero (most risky) to 100 (least risky).  
This is one component of the widely used ICRG institutional quality index that also takes 
economic and financial risk into account.  We omit the economic and financial risk 
components because they could be argued to be endogenous to inflation. 
 
The political risk rating is based on twelve risk indicators, as judged by ICRG staff.  
Government stability, socioeconomic tensions, risks to investments, internal conflict and 
external conflict each count for a maximum of twelve points.  Less important are:  corruption, 
involvement of the military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, 
democratic accountability (all six points maximum) and the quality of the bureaucracy (four 
points maximum).  The dummy for inflation targeting is equal to one only for Ghana (2002 
onwards) and South Africa (2000 onwards).   
 
Table 5 shows the results, once again for sub-Saharan African countries with population 
exceeding 1.5 million from 1996 onwards. The sample size is reduced because of the lack of 
political stability data for some countries.  The first column shows the regression for 
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transformed inflation.  The R-squared of 0.379 is much higher than when only the fiscal 
balance was included as a regressor. The time trend now has a positive coefficient but it is not 
significant, which suggests that the improving inflation trend is associated with trends in the 
explanatory variables rather than omitted factors. The hard peg dummy has a highly 
significant negative coefficient, indicating that the CFA countries tend to have lower 
inflation.  The float dummy has a positive but insignificant and small coefficient of about 
0.6%.  Real exchange rate appreciation in the current year is surprisingly estimated to have a 
significant positive impact on inflation, which is almost exactly matched by the significant 
negative impact of lagged appreciation.  The latter is more in line with the expected effect of 
imported inflation. 
 
The fiscal balance has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level.  Its magnitude 
implies that a fiscal deficit that is larger by 1% of GDP is associated with approximately 
0.3% p.a. of extra inflation, which is rather greater than implied by the bivariate regressions 
of Table 2.  The production structure variables suggest that countries that specialize in non-oil 
mineral resources (about 15% of the sample) have significantly higher inflation, while oil 
producers (also about 15% of the sample) may also do so (the coefficient is significant at only 
the 10% level).  Political stability has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level: 
countries with greater political risks tend to have higher inflation.  The inflation targeting 
dummy has an insignificant but positive coefficient, which is the opposite of what was 
expected, but it is based on only two countries. 
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Table 5. Additional variables 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 15.02*** 
(5.07) 
  
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.024 
(0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.08) 
0.0598 
(1.11) 
Hard peg dummy -5.84*** 
(-8.50) 
 -0.409*** 
(-10.66) 
Float dummy 0.575 
(0.75) 
0.029* 
(1.89) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
11.11** 
(2.49) 
0.075 
(0.87) 
0.566* 
(1.86) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-11.27** 
(-2.25) 
-0.090 
(-1.34) 
-0.529* 
(-1.91) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-28.1*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.964*** 
(-3.48) 
-2.53*** 
(-3.35) 
Non-oil mineral 
producer 
1.67** 
(2.45) 
0.0246 
(0.95) 
0.144* 
(1.87) 
Oil producer 1.93* 
(1.72) 
0.626 
(1.10) 
0.159 
(1.64) 
Political stability -0.135*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.0025*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.0073** 
(-2.35) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
0.680 
(0.64) 
0.078 
(0.22) 
0.075 
(0.68) 
N 367 367 367 
R-squared 0.379 0.264 0.263 
Standard error 4.88   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices. The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. REER – 
real effective exchange rate. Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and Tian (2014). 
 
 
In short, the three variables that seemed a priori most likely to emerge significant and with 
the expected sign do so: the presence or absence of a hard peg, the fiscal balance and political 
stability. 
 
The second and third columns of Table 5 are probits for inflation above 20% and 10% 
respectively, using the same regressors (except that the hard peg dummy is omitted for 20%, 
because there are no cases of hard pegs with inflation that high).  The point of estimating a 
probit is that an ordinary inflation regression may be unduly sensitive to a few outliers, and 
so replacing transformed inflation with the probability that inflation is above some threshold 
level can be seen as a form of robustness test.  The figures of 20% and 10% are obviously 
arbitrary to some extent; inflation above 20% is relatively rare, representing only a few per 
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cent of the sample, whereas about 20% of the observations exceed 10% inflation. 
 
The three variables that are significant at 1% in column (1) remain significant with the same 
sign in the probits, but real exchange rate appreciation and resource specialization tend to 
lose significance. The marginal effects imply that a hard peg reduces the probability of 
inflation exceeding 10% by as much as 41 percentage points; being a non-oil mineral 
producer increases it by 27 percentage points; an improvement in the fiscal balance of 1% of 
GDP reduces it by 2.5 percentage points; and a one-standard-deviation improvement in 
political stability reduces it by 17 percentage points.  Generally speaking, though, all three 
regressions in Table 5 present a similar picture. 
 
Since political stability is quite highly correlated with per capita GDP, we can enlarge the 
sample quite a bit by substituting the latter for the former, and adding a simpler measure of 
political stability (a dummy for whether any battle deaths are recorded in that year, from 
internal or external conflict).  The results are shown in Table 6. The sample size increases 
from 367 to 511.  The R-squareds are somewhat lower, and the coefficients of the fiscal 
balance tend to be smaller in absolute value than in Table 5, although still statistically 
significant.  The broad similarity between Tables 5 and 6 suggests that the regression is not 
very different in countries that have institutional quality data from those that have not (and 
we have confirmed this with a Chow test). 
 
It is possible that the relationship between the inflation rate and the fiscal balance is non-
linear.  To test this, we have tried adding the square of the fiscal balance to the regression, but 
it was never significant.  We have also tried including world GDP growth, as a measure of 
global output shocks, but this variable was also not significant. 
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Table 6. Replacing political instability by lagged real per capita GDP 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 12.63*** 
(7.99) 
  
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.067 
(1.19) 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
0.0071* 
(1.72) 
Hard peg dummy -5.49*** 
(-10.66) 
 -0.339*** 
(-10.37) 
Float dummy 0.31 
(0.50) 
0.030* 
 (1.66) 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
8.47 
(1.53) 
-0.013 
(-0.13) 
0.269 
(1.14) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-9.88** 
(-2.25) 
-0.193** 
(-2.35) 
-0.454** 
(-2.05) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-16.9*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.900*** 
(-4.33) 
-1.51** 
(-2.79) 
Non-oil mineral 
producer 
1.39** 
(2.47) 
0.031 
(1.02) 
0.175** 
(2.54) 
Oil producer 3.05*** 
(3.08) 
0.118** 
(2.20) 
0.392*** 
(5.07) 
Lagged ln(GDPpc 
in constant US$) 
-0.915*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.0119 
(-1.36) 
-0.0967*** 
(-5.11) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
1.16 
(1.32) 
-0.0068 
(-0.19) 
0.232** 
(2.02) 
n 511 511 511 
R-squared 0.304 0.144 0.258 
Standard error 5.01   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  ERR 
data: Bleaney & Tian (2014). Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer 
prices. The probit regressions show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the 
average of years T-3 to T.  Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and Tian (2014). 
 
In Tables 7 and 8 we add the lagged dependent variable to the model, to capture inflation 
persistence, first with political stability (Table 7) and then with per capita GDP (Table 8).  
The lagged dependent variable is always highly significant, and its inclusion greatly improves 
the fit.  On the other hand all the other variables tend to get less significant than before.  In 
Table 7 the hard peg dummy is still significant at the 1% level.  The fiscal balance is still 
significant at 5% in all three cases, whereas it was significant at 1% in all three cases in Table 
5.  The time trend is still insignificant with a small positive sign. 
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Table 7. With lagged inflation and political instability 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 5.86*** 
(2.67) 
  
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.538*** 
(8.10) 
0.353** 
(2.43) 
0.331*** 
(5.22) 
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.0965* 
(1.74) 
0.00159 
(1.43) 
0.0051 
(0.90) 
Hard peg dummy -2.60*** 
(-3.44) 
 -0.340*** 
(-7.09) 
Float dummy 0.23 
(0.38) 
0.0141 
(1.22) 
-0.0096 
(-0.18) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
2.43 
(0.62) 
-0.0167 
(-0.26) 
0.322 
(1.02) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-16.23*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.0928* 
(-1.80) 
-0.748** 
(-2.39) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-10.71** 
(-2.00) 
-0.420** 
(-2.39) 
-2.76** 
(-2.22) 
Non-oil mineral 
producer 
0.49 
(0.89) 
-0.0095 
(-0.91) 
0.091 
(1.12) 
Oil producer 0.95 
(1.41) 
0.0186 
(0.78) 
0.144 
(1.56) 
Political stability -0.053* 
(-1.79) 
-0.00149 
(-1.35) 
-0.00463 
(-1.34) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
-0.035 
(-0.04) 
0.0009 
(0.01) 
0.0272 
(0.26) 
n 363 363 363 
R-squared 0.609 0.441 0.335 
Standard error 3.87   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices. The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. 
Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and Tian (2014). 
 
Table 8 includes the lagged dependent variable with per capita GDP rather than political 
stability.   The hard peg dummy and the fiscal balance remain consistently significant.  The 
estimated coefficients of the fiscal balance (and other variables) are smaller in absolute value 
in Tables 7 and 8, because they measure only the impact effect, and the estimated long-run 
effect is greater than the impact effect because of inflation persistence.  If the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is a, the ratio of the estimated long-run effect of 
a variable to the estimated short-run effect is 1/(1-a).  Using this formula, the estimated long-
run effect of the fiscal balance is fairly similar in Tables 7 and 8 to in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively. 
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Table 8. With lagged inflation and lagged real per capita GDP 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 6.15*** 
(3.42) 
  
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.460*** 
(6.74) 
0.400*** 
(3.81) 
0.237*** 
(4.45) 
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.105** 
(2.30) 
0.00155 
(1.05) 
0.00611 
(1.44) 
Hard peg dummy -2.93*** 
(-4.82) 
 -0.291*** 
(-8.12) 
Float dummy 0.048 
(0.09) 
0.0085 
 (0.65) 
-0.0047 
(-0.12) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
-0.141 
(-0.02) 
-0.101* 
(-1.63) 
0.080 
(0.33) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-13.75*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.131* 
(-1.89) 
-0.577** 
(-2.11) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-8.47* 
(-1.87) 
-0.454*** 
(-2.61) 
-1.13** 
(-2.03) 
Non-oil mineral 
producer 
0.538 
(1.12) 
-0.0062 
(-0.38) 
0.332*** 
(4.25) 
Oil producer 1.74** 
(2.34) 
0.0553* 
(1.72) 
0.127* 
(1.79) 
Lagged ln(GDPpc 
in constant US$) 
-0.453** 
(-2.09) 
-0.0091 
(-1.23) 
-0.0755*** 
(-3.92) 
Inflation targeting 
dummy 
0.346 
(0.43) 
-0.0096 
(-0.36) 
0.161 
(1.43) 
n 505 505 505 
R-squared 0.476 0.338 0.301 
Standard error 4.35   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices. The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. 
Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and Tian (2014). 
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3. Supply-side shocks 
When agricultural production, including the production of food, represents a sizeable 
proportion of output, then fluctuations of real GDP about its trend are likely to be strongly 
influenced by environmental conditions that determine the quality of the harvest. For 
example Block (2014, Table 2) estimates that 10% more rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa 
increases crop output per agricultural worker by 3.7%. Moreover in low-income economies 
food typically represents a large proportion of consumption.  When conditions boost food 
production, GDP is higher but food prices are lower, and so is the consumer price index.  In 
first differences, inflation will be negatively correlated with GDP growth.  Since this effect is 
likely to be weaker in countries that produce a lot of oil or other minerals, and where 
agriculture is consequently less important, we allow the coefficient to differ between 
countries with large natural resource rents and those without.  We also include a measure of 
the output gap to capture possible Phillips curve effects, even though previous research 
suggests that they are not significant in sub-Saharan Africa (Male, 2010). To allow for 
fluctuations in world commodity prices, we include changes in the world (real US$) price of 
oil and basic foodstuffs (rice, maize) in the regression. 
 
Table 9 shows the results for the smaller sample for which the political stability measure is 
available.  The float dummy is omitted since it has never been significant in previous tables.  
Inclusion of the variables that are intended to capture supply-side shocks makes the hard-peg 
dummy, the fiscal balance and political stability even more significant than in Table 7.  The 
output gap is never significant and only has the expected positive sign in one case (the 10% 
probit).  The supply-side variables tend not to be significant in the 20% probit, presumably 
because supply-side shocks are not usually large enough to propel countries over the 20% 
inflation threshold, but the world price of rice is highly significant in columns (1) and (3).  
World oil and maize prices have the expected positive coefficient but are less significant. 
Output growth for resource-rich economies has a positive coefficient and is never significant.  
Output growth in resource-poor economies is significant with the expected negative 
coefficient at 10% in column (1) and 5% in column (3).  Taking the point estimates from the 
first column of Table 9 suggests that a 10% increase in the real price of oil, rice and maize 
add about 0.2, 0.6 and 0.1 percentage points respectively to the inflation rate, whilst a 1% 
reduction in the growth rate in resource-poor countries increases inflation by about 0.1%. 
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Table 10 shows the same regression for the larger sample using real per capita GDP  instead 
of political stability. The coefficient of output growth for resource-poor economies is now 
significantly negative at the 1% level in columns (1) and ((3), and as predicted is more 
negative than the same coefficient for resource-rich economies.  Rice prices are significantly 
positive at 1% in two out of three cases.  As in Table 9, the maize price coefficient, although 
positive, is never significant. 
 
Table 9. With price shocks and institutional quality 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 6.24*** 
(3.61) 
  
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.571*** 
(8.92) 
0.415*** 
(3.05) 
0.416*** 
(5.72) 
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.0647 
(1.00) 
0.00047 
(0.78) 
-0.00116 
(-0.19) 
Hard peg dummy -2.66*** 
(-5.38) 
 
 
-0.349*** 
(-8.71) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
-1.76 
(-0.50) 
-0.0329 
(-0.88) 
-0.192 
(-0.67) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-16.14*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.0534 
(-1.43) 
-0.758** 
(-2.25) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-12.6*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.195 
(-1.61) 
-2.25*** 
(-3.71) 
Political stability -0.0571** 
(-2.25) 
-0.00105** 
(-2.07) 
-0.00566** 
(-2.17) 
dln (real oil price) 1.95* 
(1.93) 
0.0353** 
(2.10) 
0.130 
(0.96) 
Output gap -0.96 
(-0.21) 
-0.053 
(-0.92) 
0.230 
(0.52) 
NR dummy *  
gdp growth 
3.35 
(0.75) 
0.030 
(0.53) 
0.668 
(1.32) 
No NR dummy * 
gdp growth 
-13.88* 
(-1.80) 
0.085 
(1.13) 
-1.730** 
(-2.53) 
dln (real rice 
price) 
6.09*** 
(6.37) 
0.769 
(0.86) 
0.734*** 
(4.67) 
dln (real maize 
price) 
0.86 
(0.59) 
1.36* 
(1.65) 
0.120 
(0.80) 
N 363 388 363 
R-squared 0.661 0.495 0.434 
Standard error 3.61   
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices. The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. Output 
gap: deviation of ln(real GDP) from Hodrick-Prescott trend. Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and 
Tian (2014). 
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Table 10. With price shocks and lagged real per capita GDP 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Probit (inflation > 
20%) 
Probit (inflation > 
10%) 
Constant 6.74*** 
(4.17) 
  
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.503*** 
(7.49) 
0.389*** 
(3.97) 
0.329*** 
(5.65) 
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.0656 
(1.25) 
0.00028 
(0.31) 
0.00264 
(0.60) 
Hard peg dummy -2.82*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.0127 
(-1.62) 
-0.284*** 
(-9.11) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
-3.40 
(-0.64) 
0.0217 
(0.90) 
-0.0899 
(-0.44) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-13.76*** 
(-2.93) 
0.0437 
(1.32) 
-0.529** 
(-1.96) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-10.7*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.216* 
(-1.88) 
-1.38*** 
(-3.19) 
Lagged ln(GDPpc 
in constant US$) 
-0.461** 
(-2.59) 
-0.0050 
(-1.32) 
-0.0678*** 
(-4.03) 
dln (real oil price) 1.50 
(1.55) 
0.0489** 
(2.30) 
0.0578 
(0.57) 
Output gap 1.47 
(0.37) 
-0.047 
(-0.74) 
0.050 
(0.14) 
NR dummy *  
gdp growth 
0.82 
(0.16) 
-0.016 
(-0.18) 
0.829* 
(1.69) 
No NR dummy * 
gdp growth 
-24.96*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.125 
(-1.56) 
-1.93*** 
(-3.45) 
dln (real rice 
price) 
7.52*** 
(7.03) 
0.0397* 
(1.92) 
0.665*** 
(6.27) 
dln (real maize 
price) 
0.063 
(0.05) 
0.0404 
(1.61) 
0.0002 
(0.00) 
n 505 538 505 
R-squared 0.547 0.423 0.386 
Standard error 4.05   
Notes. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. 
Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer prices. The probit regressions 
show the marginal effects and the pseudo-R-squared. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. Output 
gap: deviation of ln(real GDP) from Hodrick-Prescott trend.  Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and 
Tian (2014). 
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Do the results look very different if we introduce country fixed effects?  One disadvantage is 
that some degree of bias is introduced into the OLS coefficients by having the lagged 
dependent variable as well, although the bias is limited by the relatively long time dimension 
of the panel (as the time dimension tends to infinity, the bias tends to zero). Table 11 shows 
the results (the probits are omitted because the algorithm failed to converge).  Some variables 
with little time variation (e.g. political stability) have been omitted.  The results are similar to 
Table 10. 
 
 Table 11.  With country fixed/random effects 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Transformed 
inflation 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.399*** 
(4.45) 
Time 
(=0 in 2000) 
0.0408 
(0.83) 
Change in ln 
(REER) 
-3.26 
(-0.50) 
Lagged change in 
ln (REER) 
-14.78*** 
(-3.45) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
-6.76* 
(-1.95) 
dln (real oil price) 0.89 
(0.98) 
Output gap -0.99 
(-0.26) 
NR dummy *  
gdp growth 
-0.80 
(-0.22) 
No NR dummy * 
gdp growth 
-14.00 
(-1.46) 
dln (real rice 
price) 
7.51*** 
(7.46) 
dln (real maize 
price) 
0.442 
(0.51) 
n 538 
No. of countries 39 
Standard error 3.93 
Notes.  Country fixed effects included. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 
10, 5 and 1% respectively.  Transformed inflation =100p/(1+p), where p is the change in the log of consumer 
prices. The fiscal balance is the average of years T-3 to T. Output gap: deviation of ln(real GDP) from Hodrick-
Prescott trend. 
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4. Determinants of fiscal balances 
Since fiscal balances were consistently significant in our inflation regressions, we end by 
considering some of the determinants of the fiscal balance.  We regress the current-year fiscal 
balance as a percentage of GDP on a time trend, exchange rate regime dummies, political 
stability (or alternatively lagged real per capita GDP and a dummy for battle-related deaths), 
and dummies for richness in oil and other minerals.  We also include the Chinn-Ito measure 
of capital account openness, in order to test whether capital account openness imposes fiscal 
discipline. The results are shown in Table 12, both with (columns 2 and 4) and without 
(columns 1 and 3) the lagged fiscal balance, which is highly significant, reflecting a strong 
element of persistence in the dependent variable. 
 
  
The time trend has a positive coefficient, which is more significant for the larger sample, and 
which suggests a trend improvement in the fiscal balance of the average country by about 
0.1% of GDP per year.  The dummy for a hard peg exchange rate regime is significant at 5% 
or nearly so in all four cases, with a positive coefficient of about 2% of GDP.   This could 
perhaps be interpreted as a reflection of the constraint on seigniorage revenue imposed by the 
hard peg.  The dummy for floating always has a positive coefficient, but it never reaches the 
5% level of significance.  The capital account openness measure is significantly positive in 
the first column (the smaller sample without the lagged fiscal balance), but is never at all 
significant in the other three regressions.  Political stability is statistically significant, with the 
expected positive coefficient.  In the larger sample the battle-related deaths dummy always 
has a significant negative coefficient, which once again indicates that politically unstable 
countries tend to have worse fiscal balances.  Countries rich in natural resources (especially 
but not exclusively oil) have significantly better fiscal balances than resource-poor 
economies, by over 5% of GDP in the case of oil and by about 2% of GDP for other minerals.  
This presumably reflects natural resource rents, but also suggests that they are by no means 
all dissipated in higher expenditures.  
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Table 12. Determinants of the fiscal balance/GDP 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(%) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(%) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(%) 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP 
(%) 
Constant -9.36*** 
(-5.61) 
-6.48*** 
(-4.05) 
-8.59*** 
(-4.87) 
-2.99** 
(-2.16) 
Lagged fiscal 
balance/GDP 
 0.302*** 
(4.14) 
 0.531*** 
(7.72) 
Time 0.0637 
(1.48) 
0.0438 
(1.14) 
0.107*** 
(2.28) 
0.0418 
(1.14) 
Hard peg 
dummy 
2.55*** 
(3.54) 
1.81** 
(2.53) 
2.13*** 
(3.31) 
1.02* 
(1.94) 
 
Float dummy 0.438 
(0.80) 
0.444 
(0.89) 
0.811 
(1.38) 
0.500 
(1.10) 
Capital account 
openness 
0.392*** 
(2.19) 
0.176 
(1.00) 
0.053 
(0.30) 
-0.008 
(-0.05) 
Political 
stability 
0.0878*** 
(3.52) 
0.0577** 
(2.45) 
  
Lagged 
ln(GDPpc in 
constant US$) 
  0.663*** 
(2.62) 
0.165 
(0.78) 
Non-oil mineral 
producer 
1.83*** 
(2.95) 
1.28** 
(2.02) 
1.96*** 
(3.23) 
0.91 
(1.52) 
Oil producer 7.23*** 
(8.65) 
5.01*** 
(5.52) 
5.47*** 
(7.01) 
2.86*** 
(3.80) 
Battle-related 
deaths dummy 
  -1.62** 
(-2.57) 
-1.46** 
(-2.60) 
N 454 438 660 642 
R-squared 0.180 0.258 0.161 0.401 
Standard error 5.19 4.99 6.26 5.34 
Notes. Figures in parentheses are robust t-statistics.  *, **, ***: significant at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.  
Sample: SSA countries from 1996 onwards.  Exchange rate regime data are from Bleaney and Tian (2014). 
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5. Conclusions 
Inflation has been somewhat higher in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years than in Latin 
America or in the Middle East and North Africa.  Nevertheless inflation performance in sub-
Saharan Africa has been better since 1995 than in the two decades up to that date.  This is true 
whether we look at the median inflation rate across countries or at the proportion of countries 
with inflation above a threshold level of 10% or 20%.  The inflation rate was particularly 
high in 1994, and to a lesser extent 1995 also, because of the very large devaluation of the 
CFA franc in January 1994.  To avoid the results being unduly influenced by this episode, our 
regression analysis is based on the period from 1996 onwards. 
 
Fiscal deficits are correlated with inflation in SSA, although by themselves they explain very 
little of the variation in inflation across space and time.  The fiscal deficit cumulated over 
several years shows a stronger correlation with inflation than the current year’s deficit, which 
is consistent with the possibility of postponing the potentially inflationary effects of deficits 
through borrowing. 
 
The multivariate regression analysis shows that inflation is higher in countries with higher 
political instability, with larger fiscal deficits and without a hard-peg exchange rate regime.  
Inflation targeting is not associated with lower inflation, but in sub-Saharan Africa that 
conclusion is based on the experience of only two countries.  Inflation is highly persistent, 
but the same factors are statistically significant when this persistence is allowed for.  Supply-
side shocks are significant.  Rising oil and rice prices, and falling output (presumably 
particularly in the agricultural sector, implying rising food prices) are associated with higher 
inflation rates. 
 
Fiscal balances have been improving over time by about 0.1% of GDP per year on average.  
They are stronger in politically stable countries, in those that are resource-rich, and in those 
with a hard peg exchange rate regime. 
 
The improvement in inflation and fiscal performance appears to reflect a general trend 
towards sounder monetary and fiscal policies, without significantly more widespread resort to 
commitment devices such as hard pegs or inflation targeting.  This demonstrates that better 
macroeconomic policy can be achieved in a variety of ways, although they all involve a more 
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mature and responsible approach to policy-making, with better communication and more 
willingness to stick to promises, even at the cost of some hard choices.  Resolving conflict 
and achieving political stability is a significant component of this.  Given the structure of 
African economies, supply-side shocks to prices are inevitable, but with appropriate policies 
they should be temporary. 
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